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ABSTRACT: The paper explores some interactions between production environment 
and health maintenance by workers in developing countries.  We argue that rural 
occupations, being less highly specialized than occupations in urban areas, offer 
members of rural households a range of productive activities requiring different 
combinations of health capital and other inputs.  Urban occupations, in contrast, 
typically admit a much smaller range of activities.  We use a highly stylized model of 
a worker’s allocation of labor time to demonstrate that the non-specialized production 
environment of the rural worker raises the opportunity cost of health care at low levels 
of health, and thus weakens incentives for curative health maintenance.  Health policy 
implications of this result in the context of developing countries are drawn. 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore some interactions between production 
environment and health maintenance by workers in developing countries. We start 
with two observations. First, health status in developing countries is generally lower 
in rural areas than in urban areas (Ribero (1999), Anker  and Knowles (1980), 
Koinange (1982), Bigsten (1977), Republic of Kenya (1986)). Second, a key 
characteristic differentiating the urban from the rural work environment, particularly 
in developing countries, is the lower degree of specialization of labor in the rural 
sector. We argue that rural occupations, being less highly specialized, offer members 
of rural households a range of productive activities requiring different combinations 
of health capital and other inputs. Urban occupations, in contrast, typically admit a 
much smaller range of activities, and these activities themselves offer limited 
possibilities of substitution between health capital and other inputs. The limited range 
of productive opportunities for an individual in a specialized work environment such 
as an urban area, reduces the opportunity cost of labor time. A mechanic or an 
electrician for example, has fewer productive activities outside his specialized trade 
relative to a rural trader, who for instance may engage in a variety of commercial and 
agricultural activities. We show that in the particular cases of sickness (low levels of 
health) when both workers are not in their usual employment, the reservation wage for 
the urban worker is lower than that for the general worker in a rural setting, and 
explore formally the health maintenance consequence of this wage differential.  
  Since health care typically requires an allocation of time (e.g., a hospital visit), 
the maintenance of health should be affected by the worker’s perception of the 
opportunity cost of time away from production. The role of time as a device for 
rationing health maintenance services in developing countries has been well 
documented in the literature (see, e.g., Acton (1973, 1975), Akin et al. (1986), Dor et 
al. (1987), Mwabu (1989), Alderman and Gertler (1989) Ribero (1999)).  In Nigeria, 
for example, 50 percent of a sample of working women cited the time constraint as 
the major reason for not getting their children immunized (Akin, et al. (1985)). Since 
human capital theory would suggest that the poor have a lower opportunity cost of 
time than the non-poor, a major policy implication of these findings has been that 
rationing of health services through queues, or other mechanisms involving 
substantial time expenditures, benefits the poor more than the non-poor. We will 
argue, instead, that the production environment of rural households raises the 
opportunity cost of a sick worker’s time above the level that the same worker would 
confront in an urban production structure. The rural worker thus has a weaker 
incentive for curative health maintenance than his or her urban counterpart. 
  The relatively high opportunity cost of health care in rural areas comes from 
the fact that the rural worker whose health has deteriorated can generally find some 
productive use for his impaired health capital. For example, a rural worker suffering 
from a mild attack of malaria can shift from harvesting to lighter work such as scaring 
crop predators. In contrast, the opportunity cost of health maintenance for urban 
workers declines more rapidly as health deteriorates, since other inputs cannot be 
substituted for health capital, especially in the short run, without a substantial loss in 
income.
4 While this is less true for the urban informal sector than the formal sector, 
                                                 
4 This effect is strengthened by the availability of sick leave for urban workers and the greater 
prevalence of health insurance in urban areas. The effect of these additional institutions on health 
maintenance has been studied in the literature;  see, e.g., Feldstein (1973), Arrow (1963).  “Persons  
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we believe that our distinction still holds when one compares the urban informal 
sector with the rural sector. 
  The ability of the rural worker to choose among a range of activities has three 
basic sources. First, the rural worker has some latitude over the sequencing of 
production activities, even within the constraints imposed by seasonal requirements 
(Chambers,  et al. 1979). For example, a farmer with failing health can undertake 
relatively heavy farm activities in the morning such as plowing, and less demanding 
activities in the afternoon, such as repair of farm tools. Second, and more importantly, 
production and health maintenance decisions are made at the level of the household, 
where the low level of specialization of labor permits the exchanging of tasks among 
family members (Mwabu and Wang’ombe (1987), Ribero (1999)). This is true even 
though economic forces or social custom may impose constraints on the intra-family 
allocation of tasks. Constraints of this type, such as male/female distinctions in non-
market activities and the reserving of market activities for adults, typically rule out 
only a subset of the possible exchanges of tasks among family members.
5 The third 
source of the ability of a rural worker to choose from among a variety of occupational 
activities is the informal nature of his work environment, which unlike that of his 
urban counterpart, is flexible, in the sense that it is not rigidly regulated by 
employment contracts  or norms (see Ribero, 1999).   
  In the next section, we use a simple analytical model to bring out the key 
relationships between production structure, health maintenance, and health status. 




2. The  model 
 
In standard neoclassical labor economics, workers choose between two activities, 
wage-earning labor and leisure. The optimum allocation of time is to work until the 
marginal utility of consuming the wage good equals the marginal utility of leisure. To 
study the interactions between production environment and health maintenance, we 
begin by making four observations. 
First, certain occupations, such as that of the rural peasant worker/producer, 
offer the individual a range of distinct productive activities with different input-output 
relationships. Second, the activities workers choose among (including leisure) 
produce not only pecuniary rewards but also outcomes in terms of health status. 
Third, workers can choose to allocate time not only to productive activities or leisure, 
but also to health maintenance, an activity we will view as distinct from leisure.
6 
                                                                                                                                            
with a job that provides social security may be more likely to take days disabled than individuals who 
are self-employed and uncovered by social security, for whom it may be more costly not to attend their 
jobs.” (Ribero (1999, page 4). 
5 For example, adults and children can exchange certain non-market activities, and male and female 
adults can exchange certain market activities. 
6 In reality, the boundary between leisure and health maintenance is not very clear. The neoclassical 
utility theory does not require a description of the leisure activity beyond whatever is implicit in the 
condition that the utility function be a strictly quasi-concave function of consumption and leisure. 
Operationally, the theory identifies leisure as anything that is not work. This concept of leisure clearly 
includes our narrowly defined health maintenance activity (see below), along with a number of other 
activities – like sleeping and eating – that we will continue to classify implicitly as “leisure”, even 
though they may be more properly thought of as health maintenance.  
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Finally, effort can be endogenous variable: there are many activities in which 
the worker is free to alter the productivity of his time by changing the intensity of 
work. Each of these observations points to a specific modification of the standard 
consumer theory. Our basic ideas, however, can be made precise in a simple model in 
which we abstract from the leisure and effort choices and focus on the allocation of 
labor time between productive activities and health maintenance. We therefore 
analyze such a model here, recognizing that empirical work will require a richer 
model. 
 
 Activities, occupations, and health tolerance 
 
We define an occupation such as that of a construction worker or peasant farmer, as a 
subset of the set of all possible productive activities.  An activity is a way of 
combining labor and other available inputs to produce (1) a pecuniary value and (2) a 
change in the worker’s health status. The pecuniary value produced by an activity is 
the direct payoff received by the worker, which might be a fixed hourly wage for a 
construction worker or the value of a mended plough or plowed land for a peasant 
farmer. For simplicity, we assume that each activity requires exactly one unit of labor 
time. The worker’s health status is summarized by a single measure, s, that is a 
sufficient statistic for the health capital that the worker can bring to bear in any 
activity.  This is clearly a simplification. Without further loss of generality, we take s 
to lie in the interval S = [0,1]. Throughout the ensuing analysis, the parameter s, 
whose values are restricted to lie within a unit interval, represents the health status of 
workers. 
Activity i in period t, then, is defined by a payoff function Ati: S → SxR that is 
a mapping from the worker’s health status to the joint product of a pecuniary reward 
r(st;i)∈R and a new health status st+1(st;i)∈ S.  The mappings Ati are non-stochastic, 
i.e., there is no uncertainty about the pecuniary and health effects of each activity.
7 
We assume that both r and st+1 are non-decreasing functions of st. 
  An important characteristic of productive activities is what we will call their 
health tolerance, i.e., the extent to which the worker’s productivity in the activity is 
resilient to the reduction in work intensity that accompanies a decline in health status. 
Formally, we define health tolerance associated with a given activity as follows: 
 
Definition Activity i has higher health tolerance than activity k if the following 
properties hold: 
 
 (i)  r(s;i) ≥ r(s;k) for some s∈S and r(s’;i) ≤ r(s’;k) for some s’∈S 
   
(ii) If  r(s;i) ≥ r(s;k) for any s∈S, then r(s′;i) ≥ r(s’;k) for all s′∈[0,s]. 
   
(iii)  st+1(st;i) ≥ st+1(st;k) for all st∈S. 
 
Property (i) is the requirement that neither activity strictly dominate the other in terms 
of pecuniary payoff at all levels of health. In other words, while activity k is at least as 
                                                 
7 If workers were risk-neutral, Ati could simply refer to expected values. In this case our analysis could 
be trivially extended to incorporate uncertainty. To incorporate risk averse behavior, which plays an 
important role in a variety of theories of labor supply, from implicit contract theory (Azariadis (1975)) 
to theories of subsistence production modes (Berry (1977)), we would need a more substantial 
modification of the analysis.  
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productive as activity i at some health level(s), there must be some level of health at 
which the individual can do just as well in direct pecuniary terms by allocating his 
labor to activity i.  Property (ii) states that if activity i is more productive than activity 
k at any level of health, it remains at least as productive as health deteriorates further. 
Together, properties (i) and (ii) imply that the pecuniary reward functions r(s;i) and 
r(s;k) can cross at most once for s∈S, with r(s;i) cutting r(s;k) from above.
8 Figures 
1(a) – 1(c) give examples of activities satisfying the single crossing property. Figure 
1(d) gives a case where this property is not satisfied. 
  Property (iii) gives the second requirement for activity i to have higher health 
tolerance than activity k: the productivity advantage at low levels of health must not 
be achieved at a cost in terms of future health status. For the remainder of the 
discussion, we will make the simplifying assumption that st+1(st;i) = st for all 
productive activities.  Under this assumption we can conclude that activity 1 has 
higher tolerance than activity 2 in Figures 1(a) – 1(c); in 1(d), the two activities 
cannot be ranked. 
  Notice that health tolerance is transitive in the sense that if activity i has higher 
tolerance than activity j, and j has higher tolerance than activity k, then i has higher 
health tolerance than k.  The health tolerance relation does not, however, provide a 
complete ordering to the set of activities, since not all pairs of activities can be 
ranked. We therefore cannot represent health tolerance by an ordinal quantity in the 
same way as the preference relation can be represented by a utility function in 
consumer theory. 
  Along with his occupational set of production activities, which we denote Zj = 
{i: Ai is an activity in occupation j}, each worker has access to a health maintenance 
activity. While health maintenance is in reality a complex process involving a range 
of alternative activities (especially in developing countries; see Mwabu (1986)), we 
will simplify matters considerably by characterizing health maintenance as a single 
activity, identical for all occupations. This activity requires an input of labor time 
(e.g., a hospital visit) and produces a pecuniary reward that is typically non-positive 
(the uninsured portion of the hospital fee) and an improvement in health status. 
 
2.2  The health maintenance decision 
 
The worker’s problem, then, is to choose the activity to which he will allocate his 
current unit of labor time, given his current health status. The problem is inherently 
intertemporal, given the presence of health capital. In fact, the labor supply decision 
can be viewed as the solution to an investment problem, since any activity involves a 
trading off of current and future payoffs through modifications in the stock of health 
capital. We emphasize the analogy with investment by assuming that the worker 
receives no direct utility from his stock of health capital. The payoff to health 
maintenance is therefore the increase in future pecuniary rewards due to a higher 
stock of health capital. 
  The intertemporal aspect of the labor/health maintenance decision can be 
captured by assuming that the worker is endowed with an initial health status s1, and 
two periods of labor time. The problem is to choose activity in each period so as to 
                                                 
8 The reward functions must touch at least once because of property (i). Since the inequalities in (ii) are 
weak, they do not have to cross; they can coincide for all s above some level.  
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maximize lifetime utility.  For simplicity, we assume that lifetime utility is a linear 
function of lifetime pecuniary payoff.
9  
Letting  Vtj(st) be the maximized value of remaining lifetime payoff for 
occupation j under an optimal choice of activity in time t, the lifetime payoff in period 
1 satisfies 
 
(1)    V 1j(s1)      =   Max     r(s1;i) + V2j(s2(s1;i)), 
{i∈Z1j} 
 
where r(s1;i)∈R and s2(s1;I)∈S are the pecuniary and health outputs, respectively, of 
activity i if initial health is s1.  The second period value function, V2j, is given by 
 
(2)     V2j(s2)      =   Max     r(s2;i).  
{i∈Z2j} 
 
The solution to the worker’s optimization problem depends on the structure of 
the sequence {Z1j,  Z2j} of available productive activities. Our task is therefore to 
characterize the activity sets associated with urban and rural occupations in 
developing countries. In urban occupations, workers choose from the same small set 
of activities each period, so that Z1U = Z2U.  The rural occupation differs in three key 
respects. First, it contains a larger menu of activities. This is what we mean by the 
rural work environment being less highly specialized. Second, the rural worker can 
substitute across activities with different health tolerance. We incorporate this 
possibility by assuming that the rural occupation contains at least one activity with 
higher health tolerance than any of the urban activities.  Third, the sequence of 
activity sets for the rural occupation may contain seasonal restrictions that a range of 
different activities be completed over the planning horizon.  As we will see below, 
this last feature complicates but does not change the conclusion. 
A final technical assumption we require is that the maximum pecuniary 
reward attainable in a single period in the rural occupation, Max {r(1;i):  i∈ZtR}, is 
not greater than the maximum reward attainable in the urban occupation. Given that 
the average return to labor is typically higher in urban than rural areas in developing 
countries (conditional on employment for the urban worker; see, for example, Harris 
and Todaro (1970) and the subsequent literature), this assumption is consistent with 
our second claim, which implies that rural workers with low levels of health capital 
are more productive than urban workers with the same low health status.
10 
 
2.3  Rural/urban health differentials 
 
Given these assumptions, we can now state our basic result and then illustrate and 
interpret it in the context of a simple example. The question we address is the 
following:  if initial health levels s1 of urban and rural workers are independently and 
identically distributed on S, and the health maintenance activity is identical for the 
                                                 
9 Incorporating a direct payoff to health capital (beyond its marginal product in production activities) 
would not change the analysis qualitatively. See Grossman (1972) for a discussion of the investment 
and consumption components of the health maintenance activity. One could also easily add positive 
time preference, non-zero real interest rates, and/or curvature of the utility function without 
qualitatively changing the results. 
10 The assumption does not follow trivially, however, since the average health level is also higher in 
urban areas.  
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two occupations, which occupation will have the higher average health level in period 
2? In other words, what is the effect of production structure on health maintenance? 
 
Proposition  If initial health levels are independently drawn for all workers 
from an underlying distribution f(s1)  and the health maintenance activity is 
identical for all occupations, there is some number C (not necessarily positive) 
such that if the health maintenance fee exceeds C, the average health level of 
rural workers will be lower than that of urban workers in period 2. 
 
For illustrative purposes, we study here an example in which ZtU contains a 
single activity and ZtR two activities. For simplicity, we assume that both occupations 
share a common activity A2, and that the rural occupation has a second activity A1 
with higher health tolerance than A2.
11 
Using the set of activities Ztj, we can define the single period pecuniary 
production function for occupation j, gj(s), as the maximum pecuniary reward in the 
current period for a worker with health status s. This function, plotted in Figures 2(a) 
and (b), is simply the upper envelope of the r(s;i) for each occupation. The function 
gj(s) has a natural interpretation: since gj(s) is the direct pecuniary reward given up by 
spending a unit of labor time in health maintenance, gj(s) + C is the opportunity cost 
of health maintenance in the current period, where C is the fixed health maintenance 
fee. 
The optimal choice of activity in period 1 for a worker with health status s is 
now easy to establish. In period 2, there is no health investment component to the 
labor supply decision, so the worker simply chooses from the set Z2j the production 
activity yielding the pecuniary reward gj(s2). We therefore have V2j(s2) = gj(s2), and 
the problem in period 1 (see equation (1)) is to maximize 
 
(3)     r(s1;i)  + gj(s2(s1;i)) 
 
by choosing i from the set {1,2,3} where i  =  3 is the health maintenance activity. 
The problem comes down to one of comparing lifetime utility under the 
optimum production choice in period 1,  ), ( 1 1 s V
P
j  with lifetime utility from choosing 
health maintenance in period 1,  ). ( 1 1 s V
H
j Since the optimum productive activity in 
period 1 yields gj(s1), these functions are given by 
 
(4)          ) ( 2 ) ( ) ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 s g s g s g s V j j j
P
j ⋅ = + =  
 
(5)      ), 1 ( ) ( 1 1 j
H
j g C s V + − =   
 
for  j = U, R. Equations (4) and (5) incorporate our assumptions that productive 
activity leaves health unchanged (s2 = s1 if production is chosen) and that health 
maintenance involves paying a fee of C to raise health status to s2 =  1. 




j =  so that the 
worker is just indifferent between production and health maintenance in the current 
period.  If health capital has strictly positive pecuniary marginal product (i.e., gj(s) is 
monotonically increasing), there can be at most one such point of indifference for 
                                                 
11 Recall that this means that productivity is higher in A1 than in A2 at low health levels.  
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s∈(0,1).  We denote this level of health capital as  . 1
I
j s  From (4) and (5), it is apparent 
that 
I
j s1  is the solution to 
 
(6)     . , ), ) 1 ( (
2
1
) ( 1 R U j C g s g j
I
j j = − ⋅ =  
 
Figure 3 illustrates the determination of 
I
j s1 .  The right-hand side of equation 
(6) is reflected onto the vertical axis starting with the value of gj(1) and using the lines 
in the second quadrant. The cutoff values 
I
R s1   and 
I
U s1  can then be read directly from 
the functions gj(s1). 




R s s < it is straightforward to show that rural workers will have 
a lower average health level in period 2 than urban workers.  Since the empirical 
distributions of urban and rural workers by initial health status converge to the 
underlying distribution f(s1), the average health status of occupation j in period 2 
converges in probability to the true expectation E(s2j), which is given by 
 
(7)    
). s Prob( ) 1 | (
) s Prob( ) | (
) s Prob(0 ) 0 | ( ) (
1 1j 1 1 1 2
1 1j 1 1 1 1 2


















R j j j
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Since urban and rural workers with health status on the intervals  ) , 0 ( 1
I
R s  and 
) 1 , ( 1
I
U s  make the same health maintenance decision, the only difference between 




R s s  choose health 
maintenance, while their rural counterparts, whose opportunity costs are higher, 
choose production. It follows that  
 








R R s s s s E s s s s E < < < < <  
 
and therefore that E(s2R) < E(s2U). 
  In Figure 3a, the upper envelope of rural activities (gR) meets the envelope of 
urban activities (gU) from above and never goes below it. Using our definition of 
health tolerance, it follows that the rural occupation as a whole exhibits higher health 
tolerance, in this example, than the urban occupation. The existence of such a ranking 
turns out to be a sufficient but not a necessary condition for lower health maintenance 
by rural workers. To see this, rewrite equation (6):  
 













− = ⋅ . 
 
The sick worker therefore compares normalized lifetime income when sick—the left-
hand side—with normalized lifetime income net of health maintenance costs (the 
right-hand side). Health maintenance is worthwhile only if the right-hand side exceeds 
the left-hand side. Now suppose that the rural occupation has higher health tolerance 
than the urban one. With greater health tolerance, the fact that average rural incomes  
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are below average urban incomes implies that gR(1)  ≤ g U(1); otherwise rural 
productivity would dominate urban productivity at all health levels. It follows from 
this that (a) for sufficiently low health levels, foregone productivity gi(s)/gi(1) is 
smaller for the rural worker than the urban worker; and (b) that for any fee C, the 
burden of the fee, C/g(1), is at least as great for the rural worker as for the urban 




R s s <  in equation (9), 
providing the critical step in our proposition. 
  A health tolerance ranking is not, however, necessary for our result. A pair of 
sufficient conditions for the equality in equation (9) take place at a lower level of s in 
rural areas than in urban areas is (1) that average income be higher in urban than in 
rural areas and (2) that “normalized” productivity gi(s)/gi(1) (rather than absolute 
productivity) satisfy the single-crossing property. The latter requirement simply states 
that there must be some level of low health below which the rural worker retains a 
greater share of his “productivity when healthy” than does his urban counterpart. This 
does not require that the rural worker be absolutely more productive than the urban 
worker, even at low health levels.  
 
2.4  Generalizing the production structure 
 
In the case where Z1R ≠ Z 2R, the analysis proceeds along the same lines.  Figure 4 
indicates why we get similar conclusions as to relative health maintenance. The figure 
shows a variety of alternative sequences of pecuniary reward functions {g1j(s), g2j(s)}.  
The top panel shows the urban occupation, with g1U =  g2U. Panel (b) shows the case 
we have just analyzed, where the rural occupation has more activities but g1R =  g2R.  
Panels (c) and (d) give the two possible orderings of activities in the rural occupation.  
There are two alternatives to the assumption that Z1R = Z2R: the rural occupation could 
be strongly seasonal, as in (c) or (d), or it could allow flexibility as to ordering of 
tasks but require that both tasks be completed over the planning horizon. The second 
of these alternatives would allow the worker to choose between the orderings (c) and 
(d) but would rule out performing the same task twice. 
  Consider first the seasonal alternative, and compare the rural worker’s 
incentive for health maintenance with that of the urban worker.  If the low health 
tolerance activity must be completed in the current period (panel c), then clearly the 
rural worker will choose the same or lower level of health maintenance than his 
equally healthy urban counterpart.  This is because the two have the same current 
opportunity cost, while the urban worker has a higher future payoff to health 
improvement.  The same result of lower health maintenance emerges in the off-season 
(panel d), although in this case the key factor is not future payoffs to health 
maintenance – which are identical for the two occupations – but current opportunity 
costs.  The rural worker has more productive uses for low levels of health capital and 
is thus less likely to seek medical care if health is poor.
12 
  Since the rural worker’s incentive for health maintenance is lower under either 
seasonal pattern, it follows that health maintenance will be lower if the production 
structure is such as to allow the worker to choose the ordering of activities.  In this 
case, a rural worker with health status s, compares either panel (c) or (d) (the two 
                                                 
12 For s1 > s
C, where s
C is the health status at which r1(s) and r2(s) cross, this tendency is reversed:  the 
urban occupation has a higher current opportunity cost. The result we can establish for panel (d) is 
therefore similar to proposition 1, i.e., rural workers will have lower health maintenance levels if C is 
sufficiently high.  
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orderings yield identical lifetime payoff, conditional on producing in period 1) with 
the alternative of seeking health maintenance and then performing the low health 
tolerance, high payoff activity in period 2.  For s1 < s
C, lifetime payoff producing in 
period 1 is higher than the urban worker, and therefore the incentive for health 
maintenance is lower. 
 
 2.6  Extending the model 
 
We give a brief discussion here of two possible extensions of our analysis. The 
first is to model the migration decisions of workers, taking urban and rural production 
structures as given. The second is to allow the production structures themselves to be 
jointly endogenous. 
  What should we expect to occur if urban and rural workers have the option of 
migrating between sectors? This is a complicated issue, and we need to make some 
simplifications. One way to proceed would be to have the migration decision occur 
before the first period of work. Abstracting from migration costs, lifetime utility for a 
worker with initial health s1 would then be 
 
(10)      )] ( ), ( [ Max  ) ( 1 1 1 1 1 1 s V s V s V U R = , 
 
where V1j(s1), the maximized utility of a worker choosing to locate in sector j, is given 
by 
 




j j =  
 
The heterogeneity of workers here makes it difficult to formulate a useful model of 
locational equilibrium. This is a problem that occurs in the literature on education and 
human capital as well; by analogy to Mincer’s (1974) analysis of schooling, we might 
assume that there are a large number of workers of each health status, and that 
migration is the process  by which workers arbitrage the returns to health capital in 
each sector into equality. Equilibrium would then be characterized by 
 
(12)      ), ( ) ( 1 1 1 1 s V s V U R =  
 
for all levels of health capital observed in both sectors. 
  In order to solve equation (12) for the equilibrium distribution of workers of 
type  s1, we would have to relate the payoff functions r(s;i) to the distribution of 
workers by health status in each location.  The Harris-Todaro (1970) model suggests a 
possible approach; there, the effect of migration on sectoral real wages comes from 
diminishing marginal product of labor. We might think of the r(s;i) in the urban sector 
(for example) as parameterized by the total amount of effective labor in that sector; if 
f
U(s) is the number of urban workers of health status s, total effective urban labor is 
approximately 
 
(13)      . ) (
1
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Diminishing marginal product of labor would be represented by making r(s;i) an 
increasing, concave function of  .
U
E L  The problem would then be to solve for the 
equilibrium distribution f
U(s). 
  A second possible extension of the analysis would be to allow the distribution 
of health capital and urban and rural production structures to be jointly endogenous.  
Historically, the process of economic development has often involved a simultaneous 
accumulation of capital and sectoral shift out of rural and non-market activities 
towards urban, market activities. We make two observations. First, accumulation of 
health capital and human capital is an important component of the overall capital 
accumulation process that takes place during development. Second, the sectoral shift 
that occurs in the development process is not simply a migration of resources from 
one existing production structure to another; rather, it involves the introduction of 
new activities in the expanding sector. Industrialization involves not just shifting 
workers out of agriculture but also development of an urban production structure with 
higher degrees of labor specialization, more elaborate work rules, and a greater 
preponderance of market activities than in the rural structure. Development of these 
activities may itself be facilitated by accumulation of human capital in the form of 
health and education. This suggests a model of the development process as the 
movement from a one-sector economy, with the introduction and growth of an urban 
productive sector jointly determined with the overall capital accumulation process. 
 
 
3. Empirical  issues 
 
There are several approaches to testing the above model.  One method requires an 
empirical demonstration of the idea that activities in rural areas are more tolerant to 
poor health than urban-based activities.  If this proposition is true, for a given activity 
(that is common to rural and urban areas), the health status of the workers engaged in 
that activity would rise as one moves from rural to urban areas. We have shown that 
this result may not merely be a reflection of locational decisions of workers: at low 
levels of health, urban workers invest more in better health because they face lower 
time costs of health maintenance. Testing the effect of production structure on health 
maintenance is complicated by the need to control for effects of migration and 
seasonality. 
  The second, and more direct approach to testing the basic proposition of our 
model is to estimate the effect of the number of activities performed by workers in a 
given period on health status. The number of activities performed is a measure of a 
worker’s degree of specialization. More specialized workers will have a smaller 
bundle of activities than non-specialized workers.  In our model, a worker’s health 
status improves as the number of activities performed decreases, i.e., with 
occupational specialization. Panel data on workers occupations and rural-urban 
migration are required to test this proposition.  
A final testing method involves measuring the effect of a deterioration in 
health status on earnings of workers in specialized (urban) and non-specialized (rural) 
activities. The basic proposition of the model would be rejected, if a fall in health 
status (as measured by disability days for example) were to reduce earnings in rural 
areas by a smaller magnitude than in urban areas.  
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4.  Conclusion 
 
The focus of this paper has been on interactions between health status, health 
maintenance and production structures. The main result of the paper is that production 
structures affect health maintenance costs, and thus could be an important determinant 
of demand for health services. In developing countries, differences in rural-urban 
production structures could account for a substantial variation in health status in the 
population. 
  The idea that at low levels of health, the opportunity cost of time is higher in 
rural than in urban areas, conflicts with the stylized fact that labor income 
(particularly in developing countries) is higher in urban areas (see Harris and Todaro, 
1970). We have shown that observed labor income is the average of income from 
activities performed by a worker at low and high levels of health. In doing so, we 
assumed that labor income is greater the higher the level of health. Thus, irrespective 
of residence status, a worker’s mean income from activities performed at low and 
high levels of health, is lower than income earned at high levels of health. 
However, because of gains from specialization, the mean  labor income is 
higher in urban than in rural areas. In general, therefore, the opportunity cost of time 
is higher in urban than in rural areas. At low levels of health, the situation could be 
reversed. We explain this reversal by assuming that rural production structures are 
more  tolerant of declining health than rural production structures. As health 
deteriorates, a rural worker is more likely to find an activity that is compatible with 
his health status than is an urban worker. Hence, a rural worker faces higher time 
costs of treating an illness compared to his urban counterpart. 
The policy implication of this finding is that in developing countries, where 
the majority of the population is rural, subsidies for rural health services may be 
needed to facilitate the achievement of the international goal of good “health for all” 
(WHO, 1978). Specifically, policies that reduce the time cost of accessing and using 
rural health services should be implemented. Our study suggests that the poor in rural 
areas face much higher time costs of health maintenance than previously thought.  
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